Judge Randy Rhodes, Case Number: 23CHCV00897, Date: 2023-04-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Randy Rhodes, Case: 23CHCV00897, Date: 2023-04-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CHCV00897 Hearing Date: April 26, 2023 Dept: F51

Dept. F-51

Date: 4/26/23

Case #23CHCV00897

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Ex Parte Application Filed: 4/5/23

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Daniel Blumel (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Aju Philips and Rini Jose (erroneously sued as Rini Philips), in pro per (collectively, “Defendants”)

NOTICE: OK

RELIEF REQUESTED: A preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants and their contractors,

subcontractors, agents, servants and employees and all persons acting under, in concert with, or

for them from engaging in, committing or performing directly or indirectly the following act during the pendency of this action: construction of an Accessory Dwelling Unit (“ADU”) on the real property owned by Defendants located at 21925 Placeritos Boulevard, Newhall, California 91321.

TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction is denied.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE: Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff owns and resides at certain real property located at 24712 Amelia Lane, Newhall, California (the “Blumel Property”), and brings this action against Defendants, alleging that he has been injured by Defendants’ various illegal uses of their neighboring property located at 21925 Placeritos Boulevard, Newhall, California (the “Philips Property”).

In March 2023, Defendants allegedly commenced construction to convert their existing garage into an additional 999 square foot four-bedroom, four bathroom accessory dwelling unit (ADU). (Compl. ¶ 32.)

On 3/29/23, Plaintiff filed his complaint against Defendants, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Private Nuisance; (2) Public Nuisance; (3) Negligence; and (4) Declaratory Relief.

On 4/5/23, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause regarding a preliminary injunction. On 4/7/23, the court denied Plaintiff’s request for issuance of a temporary restraining order, and granted the request for an order to show cause re preliminary injunction. On 4/18/23, Defendants filed their objection to the request for a preliminary injunction.

ANALYSIS

Legal Standard

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the Court considers two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial and (2) the interim harm the plaintiff will likely suffer if the injunction does not issue as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the injunction does issue. (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554; Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 749; Brown v. Pacifica Foundation, Inc. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 915, 925; Amgen Inc. v. Health Care Services (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 716, 731.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from continuing their construction of the ADU on the Philips Property, arguing that “Defendants’ planned development of a multi-family apartment building in the backyard of a residential property is illegal and a nuisance. It will lead to increased noise and light pollution, traffic, and safety concerns for the Plaintiff and the surrounding residential community.” (Pl.’s App. 2:3–6.)

Balancing of Equities

In making a determination on the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the Court must balance the equities between the parties. If denying the requested relief would result in great harm to the plaintiff, and the defendant would suffer little harm if the relief is granted, it is an abuse of discretion to deny relief. (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205; Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678 (the greater the plaintiff’s showing on one factor, the less that must be shown on the other to support an injunction).)

Irreparable harm (i.e., inadequate legal remedy) is one of the traditional considerations for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. (CCP 526(a)(2).) The threat of irreparable harm must be imminent and not a mere possibility of harm sometime in the future. (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.) However, plaintiffs need not wait until they have suffered actual harm and may seek injunctive relief against threatened infringement of their rights. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292; Costa Mesa City Employees’ Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305-306.)

Here, Plaintiff asserts that the construction of the ADU at the Philips Property will cause noise at all hours of the day, construction-related debris to accumulate, and an increase in Plaintiff’s tinnitus symptoms, anxiety, and sleep loss. (Pl.’s App. 5:7–11.) Plaintiff further argues that he will be irreparably harmed should the Court decline to issue to the injunction because there is no adequate remedy at law where, as here, the claims involve real property. (Id. at 13:21–22.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that “absent injunctive relief, Plaintiff will suffer loss of enjoyment of the Blumel Property, decreased property values, and increased safety concerns, among other things, due to Defendants’ construction of the illegal ADU.” (Id. at 14:6–8.)

The Court notes that Defendants do not directly address in their opposition papers the potential harm they may suffer if the Court issues the preliminary injunction against their construction of the ADU at the Philips Property during the pendency of this action. Instead, Defendants merely assert that the construction of the ADU is authorized by law, and the manner in which Defendants are conducting that activity is also in compliance with local ordinances. (Defs.’ Opp. 15:2–3 “Here, the manner and method of the construction has been expressly laid out in the Santa Clarita Municipal Code and these Defendants have adhered fully to those terms.”)

Plaintiff maintains that “here, Defendants cannot show any legitimate harm that would result from the Court’s grant of Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief. Defendants are unable to suffer any harm because they are under no legal right to construct a second ADU on the Philips Property.” (Pl.’s App. 14:22–24.) “By contrast, the construction of the second ADU would destroy Plaintiff’s and his family’s sense of peace and security in the home he built over twenty-five years ago by allowing Defendants to construct what is essentially an apartment building in his backyard and in a community that was specifically created to avoid this type of living arrangement.” (Id. at 15:6–9.)

While the Court declines to make a finding that Defendants have “no legal right” to construct the subject ADU, it does find that the harm to Defendants should the injunction be issued to be minimal in comparison to the potential irreparable harm to Plaintiff should Defendants move forward with construction of a new residential unit on the Philips Property.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met the first prong of the test for issuance of a preliminary injunction.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

A trial court may not issue an injunction, regardless of the amount of interim harm, “unless there is some possibility” that plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim. (Jamison v. Department of Transp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 356, 362; Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Orange (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 29, 49.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that he is likely to prevail on the merits of the action because he “has presented ample evidence that Defendants’ use of the Philips Property constitutes a clear violation of the applicable municipal codes, and amounts to a nuisance to himself, his family, and the surrounding community of the very nature that the codes were designed to prevent.” (Pl.’s App. 7:24–8:1.)

It is undisputed by the parties that the Santa Clarita Municipal Code limits the number of ADUs to one per residential property, and limits the maximum square footage for an ADU comprised of two bedrooms or more to 1,000 square feet. Plaintiff argues that the permit issued to Defendants for the construction of an ADU on the Philips Property was based on Defendants’ “intentional misrepresentation and concealment of material information” (Id. at 8:15–16.) Plaintiff’s contentions that the construction of the ADU is illegal includes arguments that Defendants are currently already utilizing their “guest house” as an existing ADU, and that Defendants misrepresented to the City the actual size of the garage. (Id. at 4:7–13.)

In opposition, Defendants assert that the “guest house” to which Plaintiff refers “is not inhabitable as a dwelling and is not now, nor has it ever been, utilized as a dwelling of any kind.” (Defs.’ Opp. 5:20–23.) Defendants maintain that “the construction at issue has been fully permitted by the City of Santa Clarita, and has been inspected, and will be further inspected, by the responsible authorities. The project proceeds according to architectural and engineering plans fully reviewed and approved by the Department of Building and Safety for the City of Santa Clarita, and which are completely within compliance with all relevant zoning and land use ordinances.” (Id. at 11:17–21.)

The Court finds persuasive Defendants’ contention that the City of Santa Clarita has fully approved Defendants’ building permit and issued architectural plans for the construction of the ADU. (Exs. 3 and 4 to Defs.’ Opp.) Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing to challenge the legality or validity of the City’s decisionmaking in issuing Defendants’ building permit and associated plans. To the extent that Plaintiff claims an irregularity in the issuance of the permit, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not made those allegations against the City.

As to Plaintiff’s nuisance causes of action, Defendants correctly observe that “nothing which is done or maintained under the express authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance.” (Civ. Code § 3482.) Defendants argue that because they have complied with all City regulations in seeking the construction of the ADU, their conduct is protected and therefore cannot be considered a nuisance. Based on its earlier finding that Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown a likelihood that he will prevail on challenging the legality of the construction of the ADU, the Court agrees with Defendants’ position as to Plaintiff’s nuisance claims.

After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff has a reasonably low probability of success on the merits of the instant action. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second prong of the test for issuance of a preliminary injunction.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction is denied.