Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 24STCV05236, Date: 2024-04-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV05236 Hearing Date: April 29, 2024 Dept: 37
HEARING DATE: Monday, March 29, 2024
CASE NUMBER: 24STCV05236
CASE NAME: Troy Wiltshire v. Adam Charles Walker
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Adam Chales Walker
OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Troy
Wiltshire
TRIAL DATE: Not Set
PROOF OF SERVICE: OK
PROCEEDING: Motion to Strike Punitive Damages
OPPOSITION: 25 September 2023
REPLY: None
filed.
TENTATIVE: Defendant’s motion to
strike is denied. Defendant is ordered to file an Answer in ten days. Moving party to give notice.
Background
On March 1, 2024,
Troy Wiltshire (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Adam Charles Walker
(“Defendant”) in relation to a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March
10, 2022, allegedly caused by Defendant driving under the influence.
The Complaint
alleges three causes of action: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence; (2) Negligence;
and (3) Negligence Per Se.
Defendant now moves
to strike punitive damages from the Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the Motion.
The matter is now before the court.
REQUEST FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Court may
take judicial notice of records of any court of record of the United States.
(Evid. Code, § 452(d)(2).) However, the court may only judicially notice the existence
of the record, not that its contents are the truth. (Sosinsky v. Grant
(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.)
Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of
the following:
1) Plaintiff
Troy Wiltshire’s Complaint, filed on June 5, 2023, is attached as Exhibit A.
Defendant’s request for judicial
notice is granted.
I. Legal Standard
¿Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading
may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.
(CCP § 435(b)(1); CRC, rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any
time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike
out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the
laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436(a)-(b); Stafford
v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not
essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be
stricken out or disregarded”].)¿¿¿¿
“Where the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer
is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally
granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question.” (CLD
Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.)
The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be
amended successfully. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿¿¿
II. Motion to Strike
A. Failure
to Meet and Confer
Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party is required
to meet and confer with the party
who filed the pleading sought to be stricken, in person
or telephonically, for the purposes of
determining whether an agreement can be reached through a
filing of an amended pleading that
would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion
to strike. (CCP § 435.5(a).)
Defendant’s motion is void of any
declaration reflecting Defendant’s efforts to meet and confer prior to filing
this Motion. “Any determination by the court that the meet and confer
process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a
demurrer.” (CCP § 430.41(a)(4).) However, “[i]f upon review of a declaration under
430.41(a)(3), a court learns no meet and confer has taken place, or concludes
further conferences between counsel would likely be productive, it retains the
discretion to order counsel to meaningfully discuss the pleadings with an eye
toward reducing the number of issues or eliminating the need for a demurrer,
and to continue the hearing date to facilitate that effort.” (Dumas v. Los
Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 356, fn. 3;
see also Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967–
968 [courts have inherent authority to regulate proceedings in ways consistent
with statutes]; CCP § 430.42, subd. (c) [“Nothing in this section [§ 430.41]
prohibits the court from ordering a conference on its own motion at any time
or prevents a party from requesting that the court order a conference to be
held.”] [italics added].)
Accordingly, the court may continue the
hearing and order the parties to comply with the meet and confer requirement.
However, the court exercises its discretion and addresses Defendant’s motion on
the merits.
B. Discussion
Defendant moves to
strike punitive damages on the basis that Plaintiff fails to allege that to
allege facts to show malice or despicable conduct sufficient to support a claim
for punitive damages.
To state a claim for punitive damages under Civ. Code § 3294,
a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been
guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992)
10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.)¿ The basis for punitive damages must be pled with
specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are
insufficient. (Ibid.)¿¿“Malice” is defined in Civ. Code, § 3294 (c)(1)
as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable
conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined as
“despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(2).) The
term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,”
“vile,” or “contemptible.” (Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales
& Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 891.)
The Complaint alleges
that on March 10, 2022, at or near the I-10 West Freeway, Defendant negligently
operated a motor vehicle causing to collide with Plaintiff’s vehicle, causing
Plaintiff to sustain damages to his health and property. (Compl. at pp. 4, 5.) The
Exemplary Damages Attachment states that Defendant is guilty of malice because
Defendant had a history and habit of consuming alcohol and/or taking drugs to
such an extent that he became inebriated and had a proclivity to operate a
motor vehicle while under the influence. (Compl. at p. 6, ¶ 2.) On
the day of the accident, Defendant willfully and knowingly consumed a large
quantity of alcohol and/or drugs with the intent to operate a motor vehicle
despite knowing the risk. (Compl. at p. 6, ¶¶ 3, 5.) Before the
collision, Defendant was driving erratically with a reckless disregard for the
rights and safety of others. (Compl. at p. 6, ¶¶ 3, 6.) Defendant did not attempt to slow down
to avoid a collision with Plaintiff. (Compl. at p. 6, ¶¶ 3, 6.)
Case law supports imposing punitive
damages for instances involving reckless driving. (See, Dawes v. Superior Court
(1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88 [zigzagging between traffic at a high rate of
speed while intoxicated]; Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31Cal.3d
147, 162 (1982) [driving at a high rate of speed while intoxicated and losing
control]; Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892.[holding that
conduct by one who voluntarily consumes alcohol and continues to do so to the
point of intoxication and thereafter operates a motor vehicle is conduct that
may constitute an act of “malice” under section 3294 if performed under
circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous
consequences.”].)
The court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts
to show Defendant acted with malice because he drove under the influence of
alcohol and/or drugs. Accordingly, the court denies the motion to strike is
denied.
Conclusion
Defendant’s
motion to strike is denied.