Judge: Lynette Gridiron Winston, Case: 24PSCV00315, Date: 2024-04-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV00315    Hearing Date: April 30, 2024    Dept: 6

CASE NAME:  Souzan Gendy v. County of Los Angeles, et al.

County of Los Angeles’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint 

TENTATIVE RULING 

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the First Cause of Action with 20 days leave to amend. The Court deems the demurrer to the Second Cause of Action moot. 

             Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order. 

BACKGROUND 

This is a personal injury action. On January 30, 2024, plaintiff Souzan Gendy (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants County of Los Angeles (County), FALCK Mobile Care Corp., FALCK USA, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), and Does 1 through 10, alleging causes of action for general negligence and strict liability. 

On March 19, 2024, County demurred to the complaint. On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff opposed the demurrer. On the same date, Plaintiff dismissed the Second Cause of Action for strict liability. On April 23, 2024, County replied. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

            A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc., § 422.10; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Id.) 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862, disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].) 

A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.) The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint, or in a superseded complaint in the same action. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”]) 

A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.) 

DISCUSSION 

Meet and Confer 

Per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a), County was required to meet and confer with Plaintiff in person or by telephone before bringing the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The Court finds County’s meet-and-confer efforts sufficient. (Hall Decl., ¶ 2.) 

Analysis 

To state a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating, “(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff's damages or injuries. [Citation.]” (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.)  To state a cause of action for medical negligence, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating, “‘(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.’ [Citation.]” (Belfiore-Braman v. Rotenberg (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 234, 238 fn. 3.) 

County demurs to the First Cause of Action for general negligence on the grounds that it fails to state a cause of action and is uncertain. County contends it fails because Plaintiff is actually alleging a medical malpractice claim rather than a general negligence claim. County contends paramedics and emergency medical technicians (EMTs) are health care providers whose services fall under professional negligence and the provisions of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). County contends it is unclear what standard applies here based on the allegations, i.e., reasonable standard of care for general negligence or professional standard of care for ambulance operators. County contends that it is unable to produce a proper response or defend against this cause of action. 

In opposition, Plaintiff contends the complaint adequately pleads the First Cause of Action. Plaintiff contends there is no authority requiring a plaintiff to relabel a cause of action, and that the law in fact holds that the label of a cause of action is irrelevant. Plaintiff also contends the label on the First Cause of Action will not affect discovery. 

County’s argument regarding the First Cause of Action being labeled one for general negligence does not affect whether Plaintiff adequately alleged a cognizable claim. “What is necessary to state a cause of action are the facts warranting legal relief, and not whether a plaintiff has provided apt, inapt, or no labels or titles for causes of action. [Citation.]” (Alfaro v. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Sys. & Plan. Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1371; see also Flowers v. Torrance Mem'l Hosp. Med. Ctr. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 998 [“[I]t is clear that denominating a cause of action as one for ‘professional negligence’ does not transmute its underlying character.”]) 

The Complaint alleges that County was involved in the provision of medical transportation services to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was injured as a result of County’s and the other Defendants’ failure to adhere to Plaintiff’s notice of her prior surgery. (Compl., GN-1.) These allegations demonstrate that County was a medical transportation service provider, which demonstrates that County owed Plaintiff a duty of due care. (See T.L. v. City Ambulance of Eureka, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 864, 881.) These allegations also demonstrate that County owed Plaintiff a professional standard of care. (Id. [conduct of ambulance company, paramedics, and EMT assessed under professional standard of care, even though they owed a general duty of due care]; see also Flowers, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 998 [“As to any given defendant, only one standard of care obtains under a particular set of facts, even if the plaintiff attempts to articulate multiple or alternate theories of liability.”]) The applicable professional standard of care is a question of fact resolved by expert testimony, (T.L., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 881), and therefore not the proper subject of a demurrer, (Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court of Kern County (2022) 74 Cal. App. 5th 697, 709 [demurrer not appropriate for determining truth of disputed facts].) The Complaint further alleges that defendants breached the duty of care resulting in harm and injury to Plaintiff. (Compl., GN-1). 

However, the Complaint lumps all of the defendants together so it is not entirely clear what the County is alleged to have done. Is Plaintiff alleging that County owned and operated the ambulance? Or that it employed the paramedics? Further, the First Cause of Action also alleges that Defendants failed to property train and manage the paramedics. This is a different claim than professional negligence and should be alleged as a separate cause of action. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the First Cause of Action for general negligence with 20 days leave to amend. 

Due to Plaintiff’s dismissal of the Second Cause of Action for strict liability, the demurrer is moot as to that cause of action. (Request for Dismissal (4/17/24).) 

CONCLUSION 

The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the First Cause of Action with 20 days leave to amend. The Court deems the demurrer to the Second Cause of Action moot. 

             Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling within five calendar days of this order.